It was five years ago. I remember myself hesitating. I knew that it was the right decision, and that nothing would happen, but still, to go alone, to meet a leader of Hamas, a former prisoner, in his village, made me a bit apprehensive. It was 2005, during my Masters programme at SOAS, when I had returned to my home city of Jerusalem to conduct fieldwork. The thesis I wrote dealt with the "myth and reality of the unification of Jerusalem", and was based on interviews. Following a few meetings with Israeli and Palestinian scholars and politicians, from different streams, I realised that I still didn't have Hamas's viewpoint.
Muhammad Abu-Tir, a resident of Umm-Tuba village in the eastern part of Jerusalem, seemed like the perfect man for the mission. He was a candidate to the then upcoming Palestinian elections, and represented Hamas in the Jerusalem District. Almost as importantly, he had an orange beard. He coloured his beard in glowing orange henna, a Muslim tradition that goes back to the days of Prophet Muhammad, and for me, an Israeli who grew up in a society that treats "Hamas" and "terrorism" as synonymous, it was the detail that made him the least threatening Hamas member around. "Real terrorists", I pondered, "do not have orange beards."
A few days later, in accordance with the instructions I received from Abu-Tir's assistant, I stopped my car at the entrance of Umm-Tuba and waited. After a while a young Palestinian man, about my age, approached the car and looked inside. He then asked me to follow his car, and I did. Umm-Tuba, which is part of municipal Jerusalem and of what the Israeli establishment calls "our united capital forever and ever", was revealed to me during the next few minutes as nothing but a part of the city. It was neglected and dirty, straightforwardly discriminated against, and connected to the city on paper only.
Abu-Tir waited for me outside his house, sitting on a white brick wall, and greeted me as I parked the car. The whole situation was awkward for me. Abu-Tir probably felt this embarrassment. He invited me to the balcony, where we sat for almost two hours. He asked me first about the studies in London and my childhood in Jerusalem. Then we spoke about his Jerusalem, and about Hamas.
Abu-Tir was nothing like I had imagined. His political vision was clear and included neither my annihilation, nor "throwing the Jews into the sea". Instead, he opposed violence against civilians, and supported a Palestinian non-violent struggle to end the occupation. He said Hamas would be willing to accept the two-state solution as long as it was based on the 1967 lines and the end of the Israeli occupation. He said that Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, the spiritual leader of Hamas (assassinated by Israeli Apaches in 2004, aged 68, while in his wheelchair) had also publicly supported, on a few occasions, a similar solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
I knew that this was not the whole truth; that the military wing of Hamas spoke in a different voice to its political leaders, and that even within the political leadership a range of views existed. As a Jerusalemite, I also remembered well that Hamas was responsible for dozens of dreadful operations, which included explosions of buses and restaurants, in which hundreds of Israeli civilians had been killed. However, for me, the fact that I sat with Abu-Tir, in his house, and heard about Hamas as a response - to Fatah's corruption, to Israeli occupation, to the continuation of settlements building, to the despair which quickly spread in the Palestinian street – brought me to rethink the deceit hidden beneath the Israeli, and worldwide, concept of "terrorism".
A few months later, on January 25, 2006, Abu Tir was elected to the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) for his Jerusalem constituency. The elections took place following US encouragement to "democratise" the political system in Palestine, and resulted in a historical victory for Hamas's "List of Change and Reform". British politician Edward McMillan-Scott, the European Parliament Vice-President, headed a group of 30 European MPs to Palestine who were charged with ensuring that the elections were held legally. The Carter Centre, which had monitored 62 election-campaigns worldwide up to this point, was also sent to Palestine in order to make sure that the Palestinians voted democratically. And they did. Hamas won 74 seats out of 132, and was so able to create a majority government on its own. It defeated Fatah, its main rival, whose share of seats decreased from 75 per cent of to just 35 per cent. It was obvious that the Palestinian people in 2006, just like the Israelis in 1977, the British citizens in 1997, or the US people in 2008, voted for a change.
What happened next was a political avalanche. The Quartet (US, Russia, the EU and the UN) and Israel stated that they were suspending all tax revenues and financial aid previously given to the Palestinian government. Hamas was not the party they had wanted to win the elections, and they were willing to go great lengths in order to demonstrate this to the Palestinian people. According to the New York Times, officials from Washington and Tel Aviv were saying at the time that "the US and Israel are discussing ways to destabilize the Palestinian government."
These anti-democratic pressures eventually forced Hamas to accept the compromise suggested by the Quartet and formed a unity government. But also this government did not last for long. Existing disputes within Hamas were compounded by the increasing perception that the movement's influence within government was disproportionate to their victory in the elections. Following massive internal wrangling, Hamas eventually violently took over the Gaza Strip, and in the West Bank, President Abbas responded with a wave of arrests and attacks against Hamas gunmen and strongholds.
Following the clashes, Abbas ordered the establishment of a new government, and appointed Salam Fayyad, a former World Bank official, as Prime Minister. Interestingly, in the same elections Fayyad was a candidate, and his party came sixth and last – after Hamas, Fatah, PFLP, and behind the anonymous parties of "The Alternative", and "Independent Palestine". It was another indication of the democratic lesson that the Palestinian people learned, or did not learn, in January 2006.
Following the clashes, Abbas ordered the establishment of a new government, and appointed Salam Fayyad, a former World Bank official, as Prime Minister. Interestingly, in the same elections Fayyad was a candidate, and his party came sixth and last – after Hamas, Fatah, PFLP, and behind the anonymous parties of "The Alternative", and "Independent Palestine". It was another indication of the democratic lesson that the Palestinian people learned, or did not learn, in January 2006.
Exactly five years after Hamas won the Palestinian elections, on January 25, 2011, hundreds of thousands of Egyptians marched into the streets of Cairo and shouted "irhal, irhal" ("leave, leave") to their dictator. There was something noble in their spontaneous protest and desire for democratic elections, and the US - unlike its reaction in the Palestinian case study – did respect the people's desire. Perhaps a new internalization emerged, according to which the short-term benefits supplied by a current dictator do not serve the long-term interests of the specific country, and of the international community.
The US, and the "West" generally, have yet to acknowledge that the same is the case with Hamas.
The US, and the "West" generally, have yet to acknowledge that the same is the case with Hamas.
In the five years that have passed since the rejection of the Palestinian's democratic decision, perhaps some short-term desires were fulfilled, but judging by the broader interests of the Palestinians, the Israelis, and the "West", things have gone incredibly wrong. Israeli building in the settlements continues. Jerusalem elected the most right-wing and extremist mayor it ever had. Liberman was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. An Israeli siege on the Gaza Strip began and continues until the present day. An Israeli offensive in Gaza culminated in the death of 1,400 Palestinians and massive destruction. Rocket fire into Israel didn't stop, and during 2010 at least 163 shells hit the country. The Israeli soldier Gil'ad Shalit was kidnapped and the negotiation for his release have failed. Lastly, the Gaza flotilla raid, in which Israeli Navy Seals killed nine Turkish civilians in international water created a great diplomatic crisis between Israel and Turkey. All in all, it seems that in the last five years since Hamas were totally rejected Israel has only further radicalized, and also lost its only friends in the Middle East.
The current hope for many Israelis, Europeans and the US, is the possible election of Zipi Livni to the post of Prime Minister. But also Livni, if elected, will not negotiate with Hamas, and will so continue the Israeli rejection of the most popular Palestinian political movement. She may sign an agreement with a non-elected Palestinian leadership but the Gaza Strip will not be part of it. Historical Palestine, which shrank following the 1947 Partition Plan, and shrank further following the 1948 War, and even more following Israeli settlements projects, will then become even smaller and include a hollowed, awkward, West Bank, with no real sovereignty, no airports, no army, no access to the sea, and not even a border with Jordan. The Israeli desire to separate from the Palestinians and never to see them again will be her greatest incentive, but unfortunately she will have a non-democratically elected Palestinian partner to sign it. A peace treaty between the Israeli haters of Hamas and the Palestinian haters of Hamas will be signed, and will signal the start of the countdown to the next war.
Hamas must play a part in Palestinian politics - next to, above or under the current non-elected government. Not because they are nice, but because they represent the majority of the Palestinian population of the Occupied Territories. Having Hamas as part of the debate is the key to ending the inhuman Israeli siege on Gaza, to supporting the Palestinian economy and thereby ending its dependence on UN support with its concomitant negative impact on Palestinian society. It is also the only tactic that could bring about the release of Shalit in return for Palestinian prisoners, a truce, or a long-term agreement. The international community, and "the only democracy in the Middle East", should begin to realise that supporting the Fatah dictatorship is going against its very interests.
But sadly, the "international community" has shown incredibly high levels of cowardice in the last five years. Understanding that Hamas is the key but realising that nobody can say it, the general political statements of the world's leaders have time and again included always heavy criticism of the Israeli siege, another paragraph voicing anxiety about "the peace process", but nothing, not even vague, about Hamas. David Cameron said that "Gaza cannot and must not be allowed to remain a prison camp." Nicola Sarkozy said that "the siege on Gaza will not free Israeli soldier Shalit." Hillary Clinton said that "The US has been repeatedly urging Israel to ease the siege on Gaza." Even the former Egyptian dictator, Hosni Mubarak, said that "the siege on Gaza must be lifted." They all know that in order to step forward in any negotiation, in order to end the siege on Gaza, or to release Shalit, they must mention Hamas. And they all refrain from doing so.
The Egyptian people are currently fighting for democratic elections in their country. The world should support any result of the Egyptian elections, which will hopefully be held in the next coming months. However, unlike the Egyptians, or the Bahrainis, or the Tunisians, who are still waiting for a democratic change in their countries, the Palestinians are waiting for more than five years for the world to accept its decision. Particularly in light of events in Egypt, it is time to rethink the consequences of not acknowledging, and not accepting, the Palestinian democratic decision.
Yonatan Mendel is an Israeli scholar, currently finishing his PhD at Cambridge University, Department of Middle Eastern Studies. He formerly worked as a journalist in Israel, and is currently a contributor to the London Review of Books. He can be reached at yonimendel@hotmail.com
