In the end, policy mistakes -- particularly big ones -- tend to produce a kind of circular reasoning -- in which those in charge try to justify the policy by citing the need to avoid, at all costs, the failure of the policy. So it was in Vietnam. So, too, with our latest misadventure in Iraq . . . Because America in Iraq, it must fight the "terrorists." And because it must fight the terrorists, America has to be in Iraq.This kind of circular logic permeates the entire enterprise. Why has the high command proclaimed that current U.S. troop strength in Iraq -- about 140,000 men, give or take -- is the "optimal" force? Could it be because that also happens to be the maximum force that can be scraped together by the hard-pressed Army?
Calling the war in Iraq the central battle in the war against terrorism ignores the distinct possibility that it is in fact a monumental diversion from the real struggle against terrorism -- a strategic distraction that will make huge demands on the American military and the American intelligence community for years, if not decades.
The Self Inflicted Wound
July 28, 2003
