ATO - keeping us abreast of Iran's Nuclear Program
Middle East
Jan 7, 2011
Western skepticism at Iran's nuclear invite
By Kaveh L Afrasiabi
The United States and some of its Western allies have reacted with skepticism to Iran's invitation to several countries to tour its nuclear facilities, rather than view the move as a sign of goodwill and transparency in the run-up to talks with world powers over the Islamic Republic's atomic program.
Iran's Foreign Ministry said on Tuesday it had sent invitations to countries represented in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to visit nuclear sites in Natanz and Arak, suggesting it take place on January 15 and 16, before talks in Istanbul. Diplomats at the Vienna-based nuclear watchdog said Iran only invited two of the six so-called "Iran Six" members - Russia and China - who are scheduled to attend the talks in Istanbul later in the month, while the United States, France, Britain and Germany were excluded. Tehran also invited Egypt, Turkey, Brazil, Cuba
and Hungary, which currently holds the European Union presidency.
An EU spokesman said on Wednesday that the bloc had not answered the letter and reiterated that the IAEA "are the people who have to inspect the Iranian nuclear facilities".
Branding Iran's invitation as simply a tactical ploy to divide the "international coalition" against Iran, Western media and various pundits have for the most part dismissed the initiative, despite the protean value of a gesture that ought to deepen the world community's confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program.
Case in point, an article in Christian Science Monitor relies on an Iran expert, Shahram Chubin, who repeats the line mentioned above and made no mention that Iran may have other, less sinister, intentions than simply to "divide and conquer".
Another example can be found in the New York Times. It mentions that the Bushehr power plant in Iran is "less of a threat" because it is covered by IAEA safeguards, without adding that according to the IAEA's own reports, the agency has been fully monitoring enrichment activities, using surveillance cameras at all the halls of Natanz enrichment plant, some 27 short-notice inspections in the past couple of years, and regular inspections.
"We have not received any invitation in our mail box," Philip Crowley, the US Department of State spokesperson, said tersely. But then again, why should Iran invite the US, a country with which it has no diplomatic relations, to inspect its nuclear facilities?
If the US is sincere about its Iran engagement policy, it should welcome such positive steps by Iran to include the EU, Egypt, Cuba, and the Non-Aligned Movement, which has praised Iran's initiative as further evidence of Tehran's peaceful nuclear program.
A timely move on Iran's part, the invitation has also taken the steam out of Israel's furnace of war-mongering against Iran, albeit to a limited extent given Tel Aviv's addiction to hard power to neutralize perceived external threats.
Israel's main dilemma is that any military strike on Iran would only have the opposite effect of propelling Iran toward full nuclear proliferation with backing of the entire nation. As a result, living with a nuclear potential Iran, that self-limits well short of assembling the bomb in lieu of its various moral, religious and national-security calculus, may be Israel's best option, requiring the steady hands of diplomatic dealmaking with Iran via Israel's patron state, America.
Weighing the US approach toward Iran
Confronted with a Republican-dominated, and arguably more hawkish, US Congress, the Barack Obama administration's foreign policy, including its Iran policy, is bound to be subjected to a greater degree of contentious partisan politics than before.
With a widening divide on US national security issues all but a foregone conclusion, from now on the White House's Iran policy will experience a new level of complexity, partly due to the influence of such US senators as Mark Kirk (Republican from Illinois) who advocates tougher sanctions on Iran.
For sure, a US president eyeing re-election two years from now will not risk giving his opponents the opportunity to accuse him of "Iran appeasement". But, with adequate nuance, Obama has at the same time a unique opportunity to turn his foreign policy weaknesses into assets by crafting a timely breakthrough in the Iran nuclear stalemate.
This breakthrough could well materialize at the upcoming nuclear talks in Istanbul, assuming that both sides utilize all their resources, including secret diplomacy, ahead of the meeting to clear the pathway for a successful summit.
An important prerequisite would be the preparation of US public opinion, which is lacking today, thus making it more difficult for the White House to ink an agreement with Tehran, which according to the latest WikiLeaks releases prefers to procure the nuclear fuel for its Tehran reactor from Washington rather than Moscow. An important question is what Obama thinks on this issue at the moment?
Based on available public information, only a stab can be made at an answer. Obama has not said much about Iran recently and he may be too domestic-focused since the disastrous mid-term elections that changed the political equilibrium in Washington to the detriment of the Democrats. Still, it is feasible to draw on several observations that are key to how the US may conduct itself at the Istanbul meeting:
The White House is no longer alarmist about any imminent Iran nuclear proliferation, a view recently relayed to the Israelis by US officials, and we can infer from this that Obama is at this point convinced that the evidence of any clandestine nuclear weapons program in Iran is very thin.
In addition to the perception of Iran being several years away from commanding nuclear weapons capability, including a viable delivery system, the White House is equally satisfied at the rate of recent Iranian setbacks with its centrifuge technology; the apparent lack of progress with the more advanced P2 centrifuges, partly due to export controls, resulting in a declining number of spinning centrifuges compared to a year or so ago.
Also important from the US's point of view is the effect of cyber-warfare that by Iran's own admission has affected its nuclear program, not to mention the psychological effect of the well-coordinated campaigns of kidnapping and assassination of Iran's nuclear scientists.
Given the above, the US, which relies on the functional utility of the Iran threat to further the interests of its military-industrial complex, must formulate a sound policy that can continue the main tenor of its containment policy while moving toward detente with Iran.
This would be dictated by the requirements of regional security policy, given Washington's and Tehran's backing the same political horses in Baghdad and Kabul, as well as shared antipathy toward Wahhabi terrorism. Iran's former ambassador to Iraq, Hassan Kazemi Ghomi, in an interview with www.IRDiplomacy.com, has stated that "contrary to the WikiLeaks claims, Iran's role in Iraq has been constructive". Clearly, Obama cannot possibly be blind to this fact, reflected in this week's Baghdad visit by Iran's new acting foreign minister, Ali Akbar Salehi.
But, then again, the hawks in the White House, led by Dennis Ross, may still be focusing on a maximalist approach, demanding the full suspension of Iran's enrichment activities, in contrast to monitored and limited enrichment (at safe levels), partly because of the US's recent successes in widening the net on Iran sanctions.
Henceforth, threading the familiar "dual-track" approach, the White House must decide if the diplomatic track should have real substance or a figment of the other, coercive, track. A more healthy response to Iran's offer of a nuclear tour would have provided a timely signal that the US president is inclined to give diplomacy a genuine chance.
